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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
TAYLOR JOHN KETLINSKI,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_______________________________)

NO. 44971
Ada County No. CR-FE-2016-5656
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Has Ketlinski failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it sentenced him to four years with one year fixed upon his conviction for aggravated assault in a
correctional institution?
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ARGUMENT
Ketlinski Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Ketlinski, an inmate at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI), attacked his cell-

mate, Terry Jones, by punching him when the two men were in the common area. (PSI, pp.
1415-16.) Four other inmates then joined the fracas, which lasted for about five minutes. (Id.)
The state charged Ketlinski with aggravated assault within a correctional facility “by
striking Terry Jones from behind with a closed fist knocking him to the ground, and then
continuing to punch and kick Terry Jones in the face, head, and upper torso with great force for
approximately four minutes while on the ground of a correctional facility.” (R., pp. 75-76.)
Ketlinski pled guilty. (Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8, L. 2; p. 13, L. 20 – p. 15, L. 6; p. 15, Ls. 10-22.)
The district court imposed a sentence of four years with one year determinate, consecutive to
previously imposed sentences. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 11-16; R., pp. 117-19.)
Ketlinski filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 121-22.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d
552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
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demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

Ketlinski Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391. To establish that
the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. The “primary
objective” of sentencing is “the protection of society.” State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376
P.3d 744, 748 (2016).
The maximum applicable sentence was five years determinate. I.C. § 18-906. Because
it occurred in a correctional institution, the sentence was required to be consecutive to previously
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imposed sentences. I.C. § 19-2520F. The district court’s sentence of four years with one year
determinate, consecutive to previously imposed sentences, was thus well short of the maximum
sentence.
The sentences Ketlinski was serving at the time of this crime were 10 years with two
years determinate for burglary and one and one-half years determinate for injury to jails. (PSI,
pp. 1367-88.) His convictions included a prior burglary and misdemeanor battery. (PSI, pp. 68.)

The district court specifically addressed Ketlinski’s explanation for the genesis of the

violence when it imposed the sentence. (Compare Tr., p. 23, L. 4 – p. 24, L. 12; p. 25, L. 13 – p.
26, L. 20; PSI, pp. 1645-48; with Tr., p. 28, L. 10 – p. 29, L. 10.) The record supports the district
court’s sentencing discretion.
Ketlinski argues the district court did not reach its decision “as an exercise of reason”
because it did not “sufficiently consider the mitigating factors.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

Review of this argument shows it falls short of having merit.
The first mitigating factor Ketlinski claims the district court supposedly failed to
“sufficiently consider” is his age of 26. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) This argument fails as a matter
of fact and law. It fails as a matter of fact not because he was not 26, but because there is no
evidence that age 26 is somehow immature. Nothing in the record suggests Ketlinski’s brain had
further maturing to do. That hitting other people is wrong is a concept generally taught, and
mastered, long before age 26. The argument also fails legally because Ketlinski did not present
the theory that his age was mitigating below and because he has cited no law for the proposition
that a person considered legally an adult for the last eight years of his life, I.C. § 20-502(1), is so
young that his age is mitigating.
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Ketlinski also points out that he expressed acceptance of responsibility and remorse and
that he was intimidated into the crime by prison culture.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) As set forth
above, however, the district court specifically considered, and largely accepted as true,
Ketlinski’s arguments about the genesis of the crime. The district court concluded, however, that
there were countervailing interests in maintaining order in the prison. (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 22-25.)
Finally, Ketlinski says that “mental health issues” that were “likely” made worse by
“solitary confinement” are a mitigating factor. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) This argument fails for
several reasons. First, the citation Ketlinski provides for having mental health issues is to
statements he made at the guilty plea hearing. (Id. (citing Tr., p. 5, Ls. 15-16).) Ketlinski cites
no evidence before the district court at sentencing for his appellate argument. Second, the record
shows that Ketlinski was placed in “solitary” after he committed the instant crime. (See PSI, p.
1645 (letter written for sentencing about one year after crime committed stated he had been in
solitary for “nearly a year now”); Tr., p. 24, Ls. 20-25 (Ketlinski’s attorney arguing client has
“been isolated since this incident”); ----see also PSI pp. 1415-16 (Ketlinski attacked his cell-mate in
a common area).) Even accepting claims of depression gone untreated at face value, there is no
evidence indicating that the assault was the result of depression instead of “prison culture” as
Ketlinski argued below. (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 2-12.)
The district court imposed what is in the totality of the circumstances here a lenient
sentence of four years with one year determinate. Ketlinski has failed to show an abuse of
discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2016.

_/s/_Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of August, 2017, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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